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28 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Planning Guidance, FY 1975-79

1. The Planning Guidance paper prepared last year for the period 1974-78 seems to rest on the same general premises as the World Trends and Conditions paper of 30 June 1972. The implications for OTR then, particularly as concerns operational training, are little different this year from last year except that some of the probable directions of CIA collection effort have emerged somewhat more clearly.

2. The primary target directions cited by the ONE paper are:

- a. Verification of Soviet compliance with the terms of the Arms Limitation agreements.
- b. Intelligence on qualitative armament changes.
- c. Financial and trade intelligence.
- d. Intelligence on new energy sources and the related matter of shifting attitudes and intentions of oil suppliers.
- e. The ecological crisis.
- f. Illegal narcotics traffic.

3. The CS already has or will have a large stake in c, d and f above. It seems probable that a and b will fall principally to technical

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collection, while our role in e is unclear at the moment. The question arises as to what, if any new methods need to be applied to CS collection in the fields where it has primary responsibility. A corollary question might well be whether a more coordinated approach might be indicated than employed heretofore. The ways in which the Agency's response to the narcotics intelligence problem is being implemented already seems to be taking on elements of a task force approach. Will finance and energy-related intelligence require something similar?

25X1A 4. Part II of last year's Planning Guidance - particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 - suggests generally that OTR has some thinking to do about new directions when it says "...training requirements will reflect the changing mix of skill requirements and an increasing need for flexibility and wider range of skills on the part of employees..." As an English sentence, the above has a few shortcomings; as a directive for action, I can find only the implication that we must prepare to respond to requirements which presumably will be levied on us by the various directorates with respect to the needs expressed in this paragraph. Insofar as the CS is concerned, I am aware of no formal requirement in any of these directions. Informally, of course, we know we are going to be asked to take over in some form the WH drug orientation program, probably when the current running [REDACTED] is completed. We do not know the content or thrust of that course. (It is somewhat ironic that our repeated inquiries of the EUR, WH, NE and FE Divisions as well as the office of the DDP several months back evoked no signs of interest in a coordinated approach to the drug problem. Now WH has run with the ball and we hear that NE and FE are both interested to get into the act.)

5. The Planning Guidance document of October 1971 goes on to say in paragraph 10 that "Specific training requirements will result from the need to replace linguists who have retired, to educate managers on the missions and capabilities of other intelligence agencies (in support of the Agency's role in the community), and to develop managerial and supervisory skills in those replacing retirees and to meet new needs... there is more need for trained individuals who can view collection, processing and analysis as an integrated and interrelated process."

6. This statement points strongly, it seems to me, in the direction of a much closer working relationship among producers, collators and analysts within the Agency and the Community. Whether and how it might affect the CS is unclear, but its implementation, however desirable or logical, would depend upon directives that have not yet been issued.

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7. As concerns CS personnel, I can find no single specific need cited that would cause OTR to change its focus. The paper does say that in clandestine collection "... scientific and technical competency may loom larger." However, here we already have a basic vehicle in the S&T Operations Course, which could be expanded or altered as circumstances demand.

8. In short, the implications of the ONE paper may call for some change in the types, ages and backgrounds of the CS officers recruited; and there may have to be some growing away from the narrow regional and even Directorate interests. Targets will shift as they always have. But I can see no brief for significant change in the kind of training needed for the clandestine intelligence officer. There might be room for some more pointed indoctrination for CS officers on the fine points of economic planning and foreign trade as an assist to field stations in their target analysis. Beyond that I see little likelihood for additions to the training manual unless some rather massive directives are received from on high about inter-directorate training. (It appears to me that the type of Community-wide awareness referred to in the quotation in paragraph 5 above is precisely what the AIS and particularly the Senior Seminar are doing. It seems a strange time to be limiting the clientele of the latter course.)

9. We have all toyed off and on with the question of whether NOC was destined to expand or contract or stay where it is. Proponents of expanded use of NOC or of making it truly clandestine have spoken of greatly dispersed training areas which would obviate the need for trainees to have to account for a potentially compromising period of residence in Washington, or where cover demands would not permit a prolonged absence for training. Increased reliance on NOC is mentioned in the ONE paper as a possibility. While this is a subject on which we should continue to ruminate and probably should prepare some contingency plans, the NOCAD is in no position at this time to give us any guidance on the subject. They have several hundred files to subject to careful screening before they will know the present size of the viable NOC contingent. Nevertheless, area division initiative has not died, and they are apparently still able to work within their own personnel ceilings to expand or contract the group of NOC officers which the divisions administer. WH, for example, is reported voluntarily to be cutting official cover positions and increasing NOC positions in rather sizeable numbers. And the chance exists that other divisions would follow suit. New training demands - especially for ALT - could well result from this. The budgetary implications for OTR of such expansion in the NOC area would be relatively staggering as concerns both people and real estate.

[REDACTED]
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